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1 Introduction
The current global financial crisis has revealed the complexity of the interactions between reg-
ulations, competition and stability in the financial services industry and led to a crucial debate
over how to improve the financial regulatory and supervisory framework. In particular, bail-
ing out financial institutions during the crisis, together with the proposed regulatory changes,
raised concerns over the resulting market structure and the implications for competition in the
finance sector (Beck et al., 2010; Vives, 2011). The deepening crisis in the advanced European
countries and continuing banking fragilities requiring state support arrangements necessitate
a re-assessment of the resulting market competition in the financial services industry. Busi-
ness models have been changing in response to the new market and regulatory conditions, and
thus, understanding the determinants of market power is fundamental for developing policies
aimed at promoting stable and efficient financial systems.
This study seeks to undertake an up-to-date assessment of market power in Central and
Eastern European (CEE) banking markets and identify the factors that explain its level
and variation over time. In particular, this study aims to analyze how the global crisis has
affected market power and what has been the impact of foreign ownership. We focus on CEE
countries for three main reasons. First, the banking sectors in these countries have undergone
a major restructuring process as the transition from centralized systems to market economies
progressed. The variability in reform experiences - in terms of initial conditions, the choice
and sequencing of policies and outcomes - makes the case of CEE countries an ideal forum for
exploring the relationships between market competition and financial regulatory frameworks.
Second, despite different reform experiences, CEE banking systems share one common trait:
high levels of foreign bank penetration due to high economic and financial integration with the
advanced European countries. While integration with Western Europe has been instrumental
in the pre-crisis economic growth of these countries, during the crisis their banking systems
became highly susceptible to the deepening European debt and banking crisis. Hence, our
results contribute to a better understanding of how the market power of banks with different
ownership classes evolved over time and whether the impact of ownership on market power
has changed in response to the crisis. Third, there is little research about the evolution of
market competition in CEE banking sectors, especially in more recent years. Existing studies
on this topic either focus on the early transition period (see, for instance, Mamatzakis et al.,
2005; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007), or concentrate their analysis on the interactions between
regulations and performance (Brissimis et al., 2008; Agoraki et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2011).
None of these studies, however, investigate the dynamics of market power per se or try to
explain the factors that influence these dynamics. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap.
Our empirical analysis is undertaken for 17 CEE banking sectors over the period 2002-
2010 and involves two stages. In the first stage, we develop non-structural bank-level Lerner
indices and explore the evolution of market power during the sampled period. This also
allows us to examine whether competition has deteriorated because of the financial crisis
and the measures taken to remove the fragilities in the banking systems. In the second
stage, we use a dynamic econometric framework and employ GMM techniques to identify
the determinants of market power. In particular, we focus on answering the following two
research questions: What have been the sources of market power before and during the recent
financial crisis episode? Has the market power of banks with different ownership characteristics
evolved differently over time? In tackling these questions, we control for bank level, structural,
institutional and macroeconomic characteristics that have been shown to correlate with market
power in previous studies; split the sample into pre-crisis and crisis years; and investigate
interaction effects between ownership type and other potential sources of market power (such
as capitalization and asset quality).
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By way of preview, the main findings can be listed as follows. First, while there is some
convergence in country-level market power during the pre-crisis period, the onset of the global
crisis has put an end to this process. Second, bank-level market power appears to vary sig-
nificantly with respect to ownership characteristics. Third, asset quality and capitalization
affect differently the margins in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. While in the pre-crisis
period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, in the crisis pe-
riod non-performing loans have a negative effect and capitalization a positive effect only for
domestically-owned banks. Fourth, the market power of foreign banks during the crisis years
is highly sensitive to differences in the macroeconomic conditions between the home and the
host countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of
the related literature and develops the main hypotheses to be tested; Section 3 outlines the
empirical strategy and describes the data used; Section 4 reports the empirical results and
investigates their robustness; Section 5 offers a discussion of the study’s conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1 Banking competition and its determinants
Assessment of competitive conditions in the financial sector is of high interest to researchers
and policy-makers due to the important linkages between competition, efficiency, access to
financial services and stability. Two approaches can be identified in the literature on bank com-
petition: the structural and the non-structural. Under the structural approach, the competi-
tive conduct of banks is inferred through indicators of market structure, such as the number
and size distribution of firms in a market. The structural approach embraces the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficient-structure (ES) paradigm. According
to the SCP paradigm, when concentration in a market increases, firms with greater monopoly
power can charge higher prices and thereby achieve higher profits. In addition, market power
may result in higher costs (rather than higher profits) due to inefficiencies, as the manage-
ment is under less pressure to minimize costs - the so-called “quiet life effect” (Hannan, 1991;
Berger & Hannan, 1998). According to the ES paradigm, some firms earn superior profits
because they are more efficient than other firms, and this, in turn, leads to higher market
share and higher concentration (Demsetz, 1973). The non-structural approach, on the other
hand, follows the new industrial organization theory which suggests that competitive behavior
can exist in concentrated markets if firms are vulnerable to hit-and-run entry; in other words,
when markets are contestable (Baumol, 1982). Accordingly, the level of market competition
in an industry should be assessed explicitly by taking into account the actual behavior of bank
conduct (Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2004).
A recently emerged literature focuses on measuring bank competition and exploring its
dynamics based on the non-structural approach. Many studies employ the Panzar and Rosse
H-statistic1 to banking sectors in both developed and emerging markets, and typically report
that these markets are characterized by monopolistic competition2. A particular group of
studies in this area examine the evolution of competition in European markets in response
to the deregulation process, but have not yet provided conclusive answers. For instance,
1The Panzar and Rosse H-statistic is the sum of input price elasticities derived from a reduced-form revenue
function and is used to distinguish oligopolistic, competitive and monopolistically competitive markets (Panzar
& Rosse, 1987).
2See, for instance, Claessens & Laeven (2004) and Bikker et al. (2007) for developed and developing banking
markets, Gelos & Roldo´s (2004) for emerging markets in Latin America and Europe, Mamatzakis et al. (2005)
for the South Eastern European banking sector, Levy Yeyati & Micco (2007) for Latin American markets and
Liu et al. (2012) for the South Eastern Asian banking sector.
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Angelini & Cetorelli (2003) focus on the Italian banking industry over the period 1984-1997
and provide evidence that the deregulation process significantly contributed to improving
bank competition. On the other hand, Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al. (2005), using data from
five European Union (EU) countries over the years 1992-1999, find substantial differences
in market power between countries and no increase in the degree of competition over time,
despite the liberalization measures implemented in order to create a single banking market.
Likewise, Carbo´ et al. (2009), who undertake a cross-country comparison of various structural
and non-structural measures of competition in 14 European banking markets over the period
1995-2001, reach mixed results regarding its variability within and across countries and over
time. Similar conclusions are drawn by Agoraki et al. (2011) who concentrate their analysis
on 13 CEE banking sectors over the period 1985-2005. In a different vein, Bolt & Humphrey
(2010) employ a competition frontier to assess the degree of banking competition across 11
European countries over the period 1987-2006. Their analysis demonstrates that there are
different levels of market power in different market segments in European banking markets.
Specifically, the authors find greater levels of competition in the activities that generate spread
income and lower level of competition in non-interest income generating activities. Finally,
Weill (2013) examines the evolution of bank competition in the EU banking markets over
the 2002-2010 period and fails to identify significant changes over time. Nevertheless, the
study reports significant convergence in bank competition, supporting the view that bank
integration has taken place in the EU during the 2000s.
A handful of studies consider the factors explaining the variability of bank competition
across countries3. The first comprehensive cross-country analysis of the determinants of com-
petition is conducted by Claessens & Laeven (2004). The authors estimate H-statistics as
competitive environment indicators for 50 developing and developed countries’ banking sys-
tems covering the years 1994-2001 and find the following: first; banking sector concentration
is not negatively associated with competition, suggesting that concentration measures should
not be used as indicators of market competitiveness; second, the degree of foreign bank own-
ership is positively related to the level of competition, implying that the nature of ownership
matters; third, more contestable systems, as proxied by fewer activity restrictions and less
severe fitness tests, are more competitive. Overall, the study concludes that maintaining a
contestable system (rather than a system with low level of concentration) is more important
for assuring competitiveness. Bikker et al. (2007) extend the study by Claessens & Laeven
(2004) for 76 countries over the 1995-2004 period and find supportive evidence that market
structure indicators do not have any impact on competition, whereas contestability does. More
specifically, they find that extensive regulations on investments and start-up of a business and
fewer restrictions on foreign investments significantly improve competitiveness in banking.
A limited number of studies investigate the factors explaining the variability of bank com-
petition over time. Angelini & Cetorelli (2003) report that the increasing consolidation in the
Italian banking industry, which accompanied the deregulation process, was not detrimental to
competition; it was rather the result of strategic responses of banks to increased contestabil-
ity. Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al. (2005) and Ferna´ndez de Guevara & Maudos (2007) perform
detailed analysis of bank-level factors that affect market power in EU banking sectors and
the Spanish banking sector, respectively. The former finds that, while market share has no
significant influence on the relative margins, size and operational efficiency exert a positive
3A related body of literature examines the role of regulatory and supervisory factors together with market
environment, such as increased foreign penetration, on various measures of banking sector development, per-
formance and stability (see, for instance, Claessens et al., 2001; Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006). These
studies can only be considered as providing indirect evidence on the impact of contestability on banking com-
petition, since they do not employ explicit measures, but rather indicators of competition, such as interest
margins (Bikker et al., 2007).
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- and concentration in the deposit market a negative - impact on market power. The latter
finds that the variables with the greatest explanatory power are efficiency and specialization
in retail activities, and that the relationship between size and market power is non-linear
(small- and large-sized banks have greater market power than medium-sized banks). In addi-
tion, it finds that changes in market power cannot be attributed to changes in concentration,
measured at regional level. Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2010) implement a similar analysis for the Rus-
sian banking sector and show that market concentration and asset quality have a positive
influence on market power. Finally, Anzoategui et al. (2012), who also consider data from
Russian banks, demonstrate the following: first, very large banks and government-owned
banks have relatively higher market power; second, market power is lower in regions where
there is lower bank concentration, greater presence of bank branches, and greater financial
depth and economic development.
In this context, a particular line of inquiry focuses on the impact of foreign bank pen-
etration on the performance of the host-country banking systems. Our paper intends to
contribute to this relatively limited literature. It is generally argued that increased presence
of foreign banks is associated with better performance in the domestic banking systems of
both developed and developing countries, and that foreign banks can achieve better perfor-
mance than domestic banks (Berger et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2001). If foreign-owned
banks are more efficient than domestically-owned banks, spillover effects will emerge within
the sector (in addition to direct effects associated with ownership), in the form of increased
pro-competitive pressure on the incumbents. However, the existing empirical evidence on the
impact of foreign entry on banking competitiveness remains inconclusive. Gelos & Roldo´s
(2004) find that consolidation did not result in reduced competition in a sample of emerging
markets and argue that this may be due to increased foreign bank participation in these coun-
tries. Levy Yeyati & Micco (2007), using data for the eight Latin American countries that
experienced an accelerated process of foreign penetration and concentration in the 1990s, find
that foreign penetration actually weakened banking competition. In contrast, Poghosyan &
Poghosyan (2010) show that foreign bank participation in the CEE countries was beneficial
in terms of efficiency and competition. Similarly, in a wider cross-sectional study covering
17 Asian and Latin American countries for the period 1997-2008, Jeon et al. (2011) obtain a
positive relationship between foreign penetration and banking competition. Jeon et al. (2011)
also show that: (i) the positive spillover effects from foreign penetration are more pronounced
when foreign banks are more efficient and less risky and when the host markets are less con-
centrated; (ii) the pro-competitive impact is stronger in the case of de novo penetration than
penetration through mergers and acquisitions.
Concerning the influence of ownership status on bank-level market power, Funga´cˇova´
et al. (2010) fail to find significant differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned
Russian banks. On the other hand, Poghosyan & Poghosyan (2010) show that banks acquired
by foreigners have less market power compared to domestic and foreign greenfield banks.
According to the authors, the lower degree of market power in the case of foreign acquired
banks can be attributed to the strategy of expanding activities in the region and the increase of
competitive pressure that follows. Similarly, Lozano-Vivas & Weill (2012) test whether cross-
border banking activity in the EU is effective in enhancing competition and cost efficiency, as
promoted by the policy-makers. Covering 10 “old” EU countries over the period 1994-2005,
they find that relative market power (as measured by Lerner indices of cross-border banks)
depends on the mode of entry: greenfield banks have lower market power and thereby enhanced
competition, whereas mergers and acquisitions are associated with hampered competition and
cost efficiency. The authors argue that, while switching costs allow incumbent banks to extract
monopoly rents, such extraction is more difficult for new entrants.
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2.2 Sources of market power, ownership structure and financial crises
The review carried out in the previous section reveals not only the scarcity of studies that
analyze the explanatory factors of market power, especially in the case of transition countries,
but also the ambiguous results with respect to the role of foreign ownership and penetration.
Clearly, the impact of ownership structure on market power still requires further analysis
and empirical evaluation. New research in this direction should also examine if and how the
determinants of market power vary across different ownership types, which is one of the novel
contributions of this paper.
One can identify a number of channels through which foreign ownership may result in
relatively higher margins. First, foreign-owned banks may achieve higher operational efficiency
as a result of their superior investment and risk management skills (Berger et al., 2000). This,
in turn, can lower their marginal costs and lead to higher margins, provided that they do not
pass the efficiency gains to customers in the form of lower prices for services. Second, they
may have more diversified funding bases, including access to liquidity from the parent banks,
which may lower their funding costs (Claessens & van Horen, 2012). Third, they may take
advantage of profitable lending opportunities made possible by better access to international
financial markets or the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational
banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries (de Haas & van Lelyveld, 2010). Fourth,
foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks may have higher market power in host markets
due to their parents’ larger and internationally diversified customer pools, which, as shown by
Buch et al. (2013), can provide them with advantages in generating private information and
lead to higher market power at home. Furthermore, there is evidence in the literature that
the origin of the parent bank may also affect the profitability and efficiency of a foreign bank.
Sturm & Williams (2008) show that banks from more financially developed nations are able
to operate more efficiently in foreign markets, whereas Claessens & van Horen (2012) find
that foreign banks have higher profitability in developing countries when they originate from
a high-income country. Similarly, Havrylchyk & Jurzyk (2011b) show that the profitability of
foreign banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe is affected both less and differently
by domestic economic conditions (compared to that of domestic banks), but does respond to
the financial health of the parent banks and the economic conditions in their home countries.
These arguments and findings imply that: (i) foreign banks in general, and banks originating
from financially developed markets in particular, may enjoy relatively higher market power in
the host country banking markets; (ii) these differences can be explained, to some extent, by
different interaction effects with the sources of market power and by heterogeneities among
foreign banks with respect to the home countries from which they originate and the countries
in which they enter. The present study seeks to explore these issues.
In addition, even though there is an extensive literature on the relationship between bank-
ing competition and stability4, there is yet no study that examines how market power changes
in response to financial crises and the changing regulatory environment and business models
and strategies associated with these crises. Why do we pose the last question? A strong
motivation can be found in a couple of recent studies suggesting that the strategies and per-
formances of banks during financial turmoils - as opposed to normal times - may vary across
different ownership types. Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2013) report that foreign banks in Russia re-
duced their credit supply more than domestic private banks during the recent financial crisis,
whereas state-controlled banks reduced their credit supply less than domestic private banks.
Canales-Kriljenko et al. (2010) illustrate that foreign banks employed different business mod-
4Both the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and
stability fail to reach conclusive results (see, for instance, Keeley, 1990; Allen & Gale, 2004; Boyd & De Nicolo´,
2005; Schaeck et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2009; Agoraki et al., 2011).
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els and strategies across different countries and regions during the crisis years, which affected
the resilience of the local banking markets5. Following this line of reasoning, one may expect
that the mechanisms through which market power changes in periods of financial distress de-
pend on ownership characteristics, as well as the home and host country conditions6. Drawing
upon these observations, this paper presents new multi-country evidence on the relationship
between bank competition and financial crises by analyzing the (marginal and interactive)
impacts of structural, institutional, macroeconomic and ownership factors before and during
the recent financial crisis episode.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Estimation of the Lerner Index
Following the non-structural approach to the assessment of bank competition, we measure
market power using the Lerner index, which is based on individual bank-level data7. The
Lerner index (L) represents the mark-up of price over marginal cost for each bank i in country
n at year t, and is calculated as follows:
Lint =
(Pint −MCint)
Pint
(1)
where P is the price of bank output, proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest and non
interest income) to total assets and MC is the marginal cost. MC is derived from a translog
cost function which incorporates technical change in a non-neutral form, as follows:
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where TC is the total cost; Q is a proxy for bank output (measured by total assets); W1, W2,
and W3 are the input prices of funds, capital, and labor, respectively, calculated as the ratios
of interest expenses to total deposits and short-term funding, total depreciation and other
capital expenses to total fixed assets, and personnel expenses to total assets, respectively;
Z is an annual index of time representing the level of technology; and, ε is an i.i.d. error
term. Country fixed effects (µn) are also introduced to capture unobserved cross-country
5See also Koetter & Noth (2012) who provide evidence that higher bail-out probabilities led to higher
mark-ups in the US banking sector during the recent crisis.
6Empirical evidence emerging from the crisis suggests that the presence of multinational banks increases the
risk of instability from abroad (de Haas & van Lelyveld, 2011; Jeon et al., 2013). This contrasts with previous
evidence that foreign banks contribute to credit market stabilization in their host markets (see Haselmann,
2006; de Haas & van Lelyveld, 2006, 2010).
7Recent applications of the Lerner index include, among others, Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al. (2005), Carbo´
et al. (2009), Lozano-Vivas & Weill (2012) and Weill (2013) for European markets, Berger et al. (2009) for
developed banking markets, Angelini & Cetorelli (2003) for the Italian banking sector, Ferna´ndez de Guevara
& Maudos (2007) for the Spanish banking sector, Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2010) for the Russian banking sector,
Agoraki et al. (2011) for the Central and Eastern European banking sectors, Fang et al. (2011) for the banking
sectors of South-Eastern Europe, Maudos & Solis (2011) for the Mexican banking sector, and Liu & Wilson
(2012) for the Japanese banking industry.
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heterogeneity. Variables with bars represent deviations from their medians, specified in this
way to reduce multi-collinearity, which is a well-known problem of the translog functional form
(see Uchida & Tsutsui, 2005; Brissimis et al., 2008). Total cost and all the terms involving the
input prices W1 and W2 are divided by W3, such that the restriction of linear homogeneity
for input prices is automatically satisfied.
We estimate Eq. (2) by maximum likelihood techniques for the whole panel of banks
in the 17 CEE countries of our sample. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are used
to calculate the corresponding test statistics. Within this framework, the marginal cost is
computed as:
MCint =
TCint
Qint

αq + αqq (lnQint)+
2∑
j=1
αjq
(
ln
Wj,int
W3,int
)
+ αqzZ

 (3)
Alternatively, Eq. (2) can be estimated separately for each country n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 17} to reflect
potentially different technologies. Most of our sampled countries, however, have a relatively
small number of banks, and thus, country-by-country regressions may produce biased esti-
mates and lead to misleading inferences. Despite this problem, we also carry out the analysis
at the country level and test the robustness of our results using the corresponding Lerner
indices. The main difference of this approach is that the parameters in the marginal cost
equation are allowed to vary across countries, as follows:
MCint =
TCint
Qint

αqn + αqqn (lnQint)+
2∑
j=1
αjqn
(
ln
Wj,int
W3,int
)
+ αqznZ

 n = 1, ..., 17 (4)
The Lerner index is expected to range from a high of one to a low of zero, with higher
numbers implying greater market power. Specifically, for a purely monopolistic bank in year
t, L will be equal to one, whereas for a perfectly competitive bank in year t, L will be equal to
zero. Theoretically it is also possible to observe values for the Lerner index below zero, which
would indicate that the bank is making losses in year t as marginal cost is higher than price.
3.2 Market Power Model Specification
In order to evaluate the determinants of market power, we employ an empirical specification
that takes the following form:
Lint =βLint−1 + γXint + δYnt + ϑMnt + µn + uint (M.1)
where X is a vector of bank-level control variables; Y is a vector of macroeconomic control
variables; M is a vector of market structure, contestability and institutional control variables;
u is an i.i.d error term; and, i, n, t index bank, country, and time, respectively.
Vector X contains bank-level variables employed in previous studies (see, for example,
Angelini & Cetorelli, 2003; Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al., 2005; Funga´cˇova´ et al., 2010). Specif-
ically, it includes:
◮ Operational inefficiency (‘Inefficiency’) proxied by non-interest expenses to total rev-
enues following the common practice in the literature (see Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al.,
2005; Liu & Wilson, 2012).
◮ Share of non-interest sources of income in total revenue (‘Diversification’) capturing the
impact of diversification on margins (Stiroh & Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008).
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◮ Total customer deposits to total assets (‘Customer Deposits’) capturing the funding
preferences, the importance of which has become more apparent in recent years, in
particular with the onset of the global crisis (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010).
◮ Non-performing loans to total loans (‘NPL’) as a proxy for asset risk or quality (see
Berger et al., 2009).
◮ Total equity to total assets (‘Capitalization’) accounting for the interactions between
capitalization levels and bank performance. In well-capitalized banks, the tendency to
assume excessive risks would potentially be less profound, and this, in turn, could result
in lower cost of funds and better performance. Moreover, banks that are not capital
constrained can take advantage of highly profitable investment opportunities more easily.
◮ Bank size measured by four binary dummy variables that group banks into total asset
quartiles (calculated separately for each country), and market share (‘Market Share’)
proxied by the share of bank i in the country n’s banking sector total assets. As suggested
by Cole & Gunther (1995), larger banks may diversify credit risk better due to higher
flexibility in financial markets and enjoy other cost advantages associated with size.
Vectors Y and M encompass exogenous determinants of market power common to all
banks in the same country. The variables are chosen in view of the four categories of competi-
tiveness determinants identified in Claessens & Laeven (2004)’s framework: market structure
(proxies for concentration and foreign bank penetration), contestability (proxies for activity
restrictions imposed on commercial banks and entry barriers), interindustry competition (indi-
cators measuring the degree of competition banks face from capital markets and non-banking
financial institutions) and controls for general economic development, macro-economic stabil-
ity and institutional framework.
Specifically, vector Y includes the GDP growth rate (‘Growth’) and the inflation rate
(‘Inflation’) as proxies of macroeconomic fluctuations and business cycle effects. High levels
of GDP growth, might entail plentiful business opportunities for banks, yet the direction of
the relationship between bank margins and GDP growth can be positive or negative (Angelini
& Cetorelli, 2003). Similarly, the impact of inflation on margins is not clear-cut. In an infla-
tionary environment banks may demand higher risk premiums (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga,
1999), but, at the same time, bank costs may also rise since higher inflation can result in a
larger number of transactions and an expansion in bank branches relative to the population
(Angelini & Cetorelli, 2003)8.
On the other hand, vector M includes the normalized Herfindahl index (‘HHI’) as a mea-
sure of the degree of concentration in the market, and the EBRD index of banking sector
reform (‘Banking Reform’) as a measure of the degree of the liberalization of the banking
industry and the progress in reforming the supervisory and regulatory framework (see Ma-
matzakis et al., 2005; Brissimis et al., 2008). We expect that progress in the reform process
and improved institutional environment will render the banking system more attractive for
new entrants by helping “level-the-playing-field” among banks, and thereby make it more con-
testable (Anzoategui et al., 2012). VectorM also includes a number of other market structure,
contestability and institutional variables, which, due to collinearity and instrument prolifera-
tion risks, are introduced into the model sequentially as robustness checks (see Section 4.2.4
for a discussion of these variables).
Finally, the previous period’s Lerner index is included among the explanatory variables
to capture persistence over time, which is an important determinant of bank profitability and
risk (Goddard et al., 2004; Liu & Wilson, 2012).
8In addition, higher inflation may hamper competition as prices of financial services can become less infor-
mative (Claessens & Laeven, 2004).
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To take into account the global financial market conditions which have deteriorated dra-
matically since the onset of the crisis and the banks’ likely responses to these changing con-
ditions, we estimate model (M.1) in three alternative time periods: full sample period (2002-
2010), pre-crisis period (2002-2006) and crisis period (2007-2010). Furthermore, in order to
study the impact of institutional and ownership factors on market power, we implement a
number of additional tests based on the following extension of the baseline model:
Lint =βLint−1 + γXint + δYnt + ϑMnt + ξ‘Foreign’int + ρ‘State’int
+ λ1‘Growth Gap’int + λ2‘Inflation Gap’int + ψX
s
int ∗ ‘Foreign’int
+ µn + uint (M.2)
where ‘Foreign’ is an indicator coding foreign-owned banks (those with foreign ownership
exceeding 50% in year t); ‘State’ is an indicator coding state-owned banks (those with state
ownership exceeding 50% in year t); and, Xs is a sub-vector of X which contains the same
variables apart from the indicators for bank size and market share. As mentioned in Section
2, the origin (home country) of the parent bank can play an important role in explaining the
profitability and efficiency of parent banks, and as a result, can influence the relative margins.
Following this argument, we partition the sample of foreign-owned banks into sub-samples
of banks originating from EU countries, the US and all remaining countries, and re-estimate
model (M.2) with ‘Foreign’ replaced by the interaction terms ‘Foreign ∗ EU’, ‘Foreign ∗ US’
and ‘Foreign∗Others’. In addition, we include two variables capturing the differences between
the macroeconomic conditions of the home countries and those of the countries in which the
foreign banks operate (the host markets), namely, ‘Growth Gap’ and ‘Inflation Gap’. In
the last set of our tests we investigate whether the interactions between the bank’s financial
condition indicators and ownership status have any effect on market power, and if so, whether
these effects have changed during the crisis period. This is done by interacting the variables
included in Xs with the foreign-ownership dummy, and calculating the conditional effects.
In this way, it is possible to estimate the impact of each factor on market power conditional
on the ownership status (foreign versus domestic) and analyze its variability in different time
periods.
We now turn to discuss our choice of the estimation technique for models (M.1) and (M.2).
In the context of a dynamic panel data model, the common fixed effects (FE) estimator is
severely biased and inconsistent unless the time dimension large (see Nickell, 1981; Kiviet,
1995). The time dimension in our data set is relatively small (at most 9 years) and, hence, the
bias that results from using a FE estimator is non-negligible. To address this problem we adopt
the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell & Bond (1998). This estimator is designed
for short, wide panels (small time span, large number of cross sections), and to fit linear models
with one dynamic dependent variable, additional controls and fixed effects, and hence, it is
appropriate for our data and model. In addition, it corrects for the endogeneity of potentially
endogenous explanatory variables, like the bank-level variables included in vector X. Given
our choice of the system GMM, we need to resolve two key issues. First, the asymptotic
standard errors of the two-step GMM estimator tend to have a severe downward bias in small
samples. To improve the precision of the two-step estimators for hypothesis testing, we apply
the “Windmeijer finite-sample correction” (Windmeijer, 2005) to the reported standard errors.
Second, a large number of instruments can make some asymptotic results about the GMM
estimators and related specification tests misleading Roodman (see 2009a,b). To reduce this
risk and make sure that the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups, we
only use a subset of the available instrument matrix9. The consistency of the GMM estimator
9The instruments used are lagged levels (two periods) of the dependent variable and the endogenous co-
variates (bank-level variables) for the first differencing equation, and lagged difference (one period) of these
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depends on the condition of no second-order serial correlation and the validity of instruments.
We thus carry out two tests: the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation of the
differenced residuals, and the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions.
3.3 Data
Financial data (unconsolidated) were obtained from BankScope for 425 banks from 17 CEE
countries, covering the period 2002-2010. The countries considered are: Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova,
Montenegro, FYR of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Ukraine.10
To be included in the final sample, banks had to be classified as commercial banks and have
all model variables available in a given year. All extracted (nominal) variables were adjusted
for inflation, and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Moreover, to mitigate the impact
of extreme observations on regression coefficients, values for the model variables that lie more
than nine standard deviations from the sample mean were deleted. The final sample for
the first stage analysis (estimation of the Lerner index) is an unbalanced panel with 1,671
bank-year observations (306 banks). As ownership data in BankScope reflects the current
status, time-series information on the ownership classification of banks was extracted from
older issues of this database. Data on macroeconomic, market structure and institutional
variables were collected from the EBRD’s Transition Reports and the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). More details of variable definitions and data sources can be
found in Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of model variables are given in Table A.2. The cross
correlation matrix for all model variables is displayed in Table A.3.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Evolution of the Lerner Indices
We start by exploring the evolution of competitive conditions in the CEE banking systems over
the period 2002-2010. Table 1 displays the average Lerner indices for each country and each
year, as well as the grand averages for all countries and all years. As noted by Funga´cˇova´ et al.
(2010), the assessment of the macroeconomic effects of changes in bank competition requires
assigning different weights to banks depending on their market share. Therefore, the value of
the Lerner index for each country is computed as the average of the bank-level Lerner indices
in that country, weighted by the market share of each bank in total banking sector customer
deposits11. We point out three findings. First, the average Lerner indices for all 17 countries
range from 16.69 % to 22.22% over the period. These figures are comparable to the recent
estimates by Weill (2013) who reports average Lerner indices for the 12 new EU member states
(8 out of which are included in our sample) ranging from 12.03% to 21.33% over the period
2002-2010. Second, the overall picture emerging from the country averages and the changing
trends over time is rather mixed, with some countries reflecting more competitive behavior
variables for the level equation. The exogenous covariates (country-level variables) are instrumented by them-
selves in the level equation and by first-differences in the first differencing equation.
10Two CEE countries with less than 30 bank-year observations in BankScope during the sampled period
(namely, Estonia and Lithuania) were excluded from our analysis. Russia is also not considered here for two
reasons: first, the Russian banking system differs significantly from that of the other CEE countries; and
second, 71% of banks operating in CEE countries (available in BankScope) are in Russia, and hence, including
those banks in a panel regression will lead to selection bias problems and produce misleading inferences.
11Notice that using the market share in total banking sector assets as the weight produces similar results
regarding the evolution of bank competition in the CEE countries.
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than others, and/or exhibiting relatively more competitive practices in certain years12. Third,
while for the majority of countries (12 countries) the Lerner indices fall in 2008 compared to
2007, when we consider all crisis years (2007-2010) we fail to identify any similar patterns.
The absence of a general movement towards enhanced or hampered banking competition
during the crisis years is confirmed when we carry out a test of the hypothesis that the Lerner
index for each country is statistically different between the pre-crisis and the crisis periods.
Specifically, the results of this test indicate that the Lerner index increases over the crisis years
for 2 countries, decreases for 4 countries and remains stable for the remaining 11 countries (see
Table 1). The failure to identify common trends or cycles suggests that the CEE countries
experienced the crisis differently and underlines the importance of controlling for a broad
range of country characteristics when examining the determinants of market power at the
bank-level.
< Insert Table 1 here >
Figure 1 presents graphically the evolution of (i) prices, (ii) marginal costs, (iii) prices
minus marginal costs, and (iv) Lerner indices on the basis of cross-country averages. Both
prices and marginal costs display a downward trend up until 2007. The net effect of the
reduction of prices and marginal costs, which depends on which one decreases faster, generates
a relatively flat cross-country Lerner index over the period 2002-2007. Most importantly, there
is a clear indication of convergence in both prices and marginal costs between the sampled
countries over this period, as evidenced by the declining standard deviations from the cross-
country averages. The country Lerner indices also exhibit a similar convergence during the
pre-2008 period, albeit with some disturbance in 2006. In the two years that follow (2008 and
2009), we observe sharp rises in both prices and marginal costs prior to some reductions in
year 2010. As a result, the cross-country Lerner index falls in 2008 and then stabilizes in 2009
and 2010. In addition, during the crisis period, there are high discrepancies in all series, in
contrast to the pre-crisis period. The divergence in country Lerner indices in the last year of
our sample is especially noteworthy. While we do not empirically test the level of convergence
in competitive conditions across countries, our findings are in agreement with Weill (2013)
who reports convergence towards the same level of bank competition in EU banking markets
during the period 2002-2010. However, our evidence also suggests that the onset of the crisis
has put an end to this convergence and prevented further banking integration in the CEE
region.
< Insert Figure 1 here >
4.2 What Determines Market Power?
4.2.1 Basic findings
We continue our analysis by estimating model (M.1) for the full sample period 2002-2010
(see column (1) of Table 2). The coefficient on the lagged Lerner index is positive and
statistically significant, indicating the persistence of market power over time and justifying
the use of a dynamic model. Turning now to the bank-specific control variables, we can
see that operational inefficiency reduces market power by presumably increasing the costs of
intermediation: the estimated coefficient on ‘Inefficiency’ is negative and highly statistically
significant. This result meets our expectation and provides support to the relative efficiency
12The negative values on the Lerner indices in Hungary (banks not behaving as optimizing firms) during the
period 2007-2010 are associated with problems in the country’s banking system which made it very vulnerable
to the devaluation experienced, such as foreign currency denomination of mortgage loans as the prevailing
practice and too high credit to deposit ratios (Andor, 2009).
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paradigm, according to which firms earn superior profits because they are more efficient
than other firms. Concerning diversification, we find that banks with a higher share of non-
interest income in total revenue tend to have higher margins: the coefficient on ‘Diversification’
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This finding is in line
with Bolt & Humphrey (2010), who demonstrate that bank competition is lower in activities
that generate non-interest income than in those that generate spread income. Consistent
with earlier empirical studies13, we also find that capitalization has a positive and highly
statistically significant impact on market power. On the other hand, our proxies for funding
preferences and the quality of the asset portfolio appear to exert little or no influence on the
dependent variable. Likewise, there is no indication that higher market share generates higher
levels of market power.
Among the macroeconomic variables, the coefficient on GDP growth has a positive sign and
is statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that during economic expansions
banks tend to have higher margins, as also found by Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al. (2005)
and Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2010). Inflation, on the other hand, does not appear to be related
to margins. In line with previous empirical applications, we find no statistically significant
relationship between the level of market concentration (‘HHI’) and bank-level market power14.
Furthermore, we fail to find any evidence that the variable ‘Banking Reform’ is associated
with different values of the Lerner index. The latter may be driven by the fact that the impact
of financial liberalization and supervisory and regulatory reforms is already captured by the
bank-level and macroeconomic variables included in our model.
< Insert Table 2 here >
4.2.2 Ownership and home country effects
To examine the role of ownership and home country characteristics on margins, we consider
alternative specifications based on the modified model (M.2). In column (2) of Table 2, we
add to the equation of column (1) the ownership indicators ‘Foreign’ and ‘State’ (coding
foreign-owned and state-owned banks, respectively). Both variables enter the regression with
a positive sign, but only the coefficient on ‘Foreign’ appears to be statistically significant.
Qualitatively, the corresponding estimate suggests that the market power (Lerner) index is
3.64 percentage points higher for foreign-owned banks than for domestically-owned banks. To
investigate whether the observed market power differences between foreign- and domestically-
owned banks can be attributed to the country of origin of the foreign bank, we replace the
variable ‘Foreign’ with the interaction terms ‘Foreign∗EU’, ‘Foreign∗US’ and ‘Foreign∗Others’.
The results (displayed in column (3)), indicate that the reported effect is primarily driven by
foreign banks originating from the US and the EU: only the coefficients on ‘Foreign ∗ EU’
and ‘Foreign ∗ US’ reach statistical significance. Specifically, the corresponding estimates
suggest that the market power index is 10.59 percentage points higher for foreign-owned
banks originating from the US and 3.68 percentage points higher for foreign-owned banks
originating from the EU than for domestically-owned banks.
What is the underlying source of the observed positive relationship between foreign own-
ership and market power? To answer this question, we augment the regression model of
13A positive relationship between bank profitability and capitalization has been shown, for example, in a
sample of developing and developed countries (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999), in China (Garc´ıa-Herrero
et al., 2009), in the Middle East and North Africa countries (Naceur & Omran, 2011) and in Mexico (Garza-
Garcia, 2012).
14Since the impact of market concentration on market power may be different conditional on the bank
product type (Ferna´ndez de Guevara et al., 2005), we also employ alternative HHI indices based on deposit
and loan shares. None of these alternative indicators, however, have a statistically significant effect on market
power.
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column (2) with the interaction terms ‘NPL ∗Foreign’ and ‘Capitalization ∗Foreign’. Foreign
ownership itself might signal better asset quality as foreign banks may have better monitor-
ing technologies and easier access to international financial markets than domestically-owned
banks. Hence, we might expect a much weaker response of market power to non-performing
loans and capitalization in the case of foreign bank subsidiaries. The results (displayed in
column (4)) fail to validate this prediction for the full-sample period: the variables ‘NPL’ and
‘Capitalization’ and the corresponding interaction terms with the ‘Foreign’ indicator enter
with the opposite sign, but only the coefficient on ‘Capitalization’ appears to be statistically
significant. This indicates that higher levels of capitalization are associated with higher market
power for both foreign-owned and domestically-owned banks when one considers all sample
years. As shown in Table 3, when we evaluate the impact of ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’ on
margins at the values one and zero of the ‘Foreign’ variable, the resulting conditional effects
are similar for all banks regardless of ownership classification.
In column (5) of Table 2 we test the robustness of our results by controlling for the relative
macroeconomic conditions in the source countries of the foreign-owned banks. To do that,
we include among the regressors the variables ‘Growth Gap’ and ‘Inflation Gap’, capturing
the growth and inflation rate differences between the home country of the parent bank and
the host country. Overall, the inclusion of these variables has little effect on the key findings
reported above. Moreover, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on ‘Growth
Gap’ suggests that subsidiaries of banks originating from relatively higher growth countries
tend to produce higher margins.
Finally, in column (6) we test for the existence of alternative channels through which
foreign ownership may affect market power by adding the interaction terms ‘Inefficiency ∗
Foreign’, ‘Diversification∗Foreign’ and ‘Customer Deposits∗Foreign’. All three terms enter the
regression insignificantly and do not change the inferences on the other covariates, suggesting
that the impacts of inefficiency, diversification and customer deposits on margins do not vary
between foreign- and domestically-owned banks.
< Insert Table 3 here >
4.2.3 The impact of the crisis
In order to explore the impact of the recent financial crisis on the banks’ market power determi-
nants, we partition the full sample period into two sub-periods and re-estimate the regression
package of Table 2. Table 4 presents the results for the pre-crisis years (2002-2006), while
Table 5 for the crisis years (2007-2010). Looking at column (1) in both tables, we can notice
that the previously observed relationships between market power on one hand and its lagged
value, inefficiency and diversification on the other hand remain virtually unchanged in the two
sub-samples. The impact of growth, however, is now statistically insignificant, most likely due
to a lack of sufficient time-series variation in the shorter periods. The most interesting result
that emerges from this comparison concerns the role of asset risk and capitalization in deter-
mining market power. In particular, during the crisis years, our proxy for asset risk (‘NPL’)
has a negative impact on market power, with the coefficient being statistically significant at
the 10% confidence level, whereas the positive impact of capitalization is (economically and
statistically) less pronounced.
Turning to the ownership indicators, our results for the two time periods support the
findings of the previous section; that is, higher degree of market power for foreign-owned
banks than for domestically-owned banks, especially when the parent bank is located in the
US or the EU countries15 (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 and Table 5). In line with the
15Even though the coefficient on ‘Foreign ∗ US’ fails to reach statistical significance in Table 4, its size is
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results for the full sample period, we also find that the impact of ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’
on market power does not depend on the ownership status in the years preceding the crisis
(see columns (4) and (5) of Table 4). However, things look completely different in the cri-
sis years. Specifically, our results provide evidence that the negative (positive) relationship
between ‘NPL’ (‘Capitalization’) and margins, identified in columns (1) through (3) of Ta-
ble 5, is clearly driven by domestically-owned banks: the interaction terms ‘NPL ∗ Foreign’
and ‘Capitalization ∗ Foreign’ enter the regressions highly statistically significantly and with
the opposite sign to the coefficients on the marginal variables ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’.
In addition, the coefficients on these added regressors are jointly statistically significant (see
columns (4) and (5) of Table 5). The findings are also qualitatively important. As shown in
Table 3, when we evaluate the impact of ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’ on margins at the value
zero of the ‘Foreign’ variable, the percentage point change in the Lerner index is large (-2.29
when ‘NPL’ increases by 1 percentage point and +0.80 when ‘Capitalization’ increases by 1
percentage point) and highly statistically significant. On the other hand, when we evaluate
the impact of ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’ on margins at the value one of the ‘Foreign’ variable,
the percentage point change in the Lerner index is very small (-0.25 when ‘NPL’ increases by
1 percentage point and +0.12 when ‘Capitalization’ increases by 1 percentage point) and sta-
tistically insignificant. This result can be attributed to the fact that foreign-owned banks may
carry significantly less non-performing loans than domestically-owned banks, and thus, they
may have a better asset quality and enjoy greater overall stability. Hence, in times of financial
turmoil, foreign ownership can lessen the negative impact of non-performing loans by signaling
such lower risk or better quality. Furthermore, the important role of capitalization on margins
in the case of domestically-owned banks suggests that higher risk perceptions in financial mar-
kets disproportionately affect domestic banks with lower capital levels. Domestically-owned
banks may face higher costs of external funding and may be cut off from international finan-
cial markets during episodes of financial turmoil. In addition, they may be subject to market
discipline; that is, depositors may react to the observed weakness by requiring a deposit rate
premium as compensation.
The relationship between home country macroeconomic conditions and market power turns
out to be also different in the two sub-periods (see column (5) of Table 4 and Table 5). Be-
fore the crisis, the coefficient on ‘Growth Gap’ is negative and statistically significant at the
10% confidence level, possibly due to the impressive economic growth enjoyed by the CEE
economies during the pre-crisis years. However, this does not hold in the period that follows.
Specifically, ‘Growth Gap’ and ‘Inflation Gap’ appear to have a significantly positive and neg-
ative effect on margins, respectively, suggesting that foreign banks originating from countries
with better economic performance during the global crisis (compared to the host countries)
have higher levels of market power. This, in turn, may imply that while all banks reduced
their lending during the crisis, banks originating from countries with relatively better macroe-
conomic conditions managed to maintain higher margins by taking advantage of good lending
and investment opportunities and/or due to lower financing costs. When the latter finding
and the findings of the previous paragraph are viewed together, another picture emerges: in
times of financial turmoil, the market power of foreign banks is more sensitive to differences
in the macroeconomic conditions between the home and the host countries, whereas the mar-
ket power of domestic banks is more responsive to changes in their own micro-level financial
conditions.
Two additional results are worth mentioning. First, the coefficient on the ‘State’ indicator
becomes stronger (both economically and statistically) during the crisis years compared to
the preceding years, although the corroborating evidence is still statistically weak (the highest
z-statistic, obtained in the equation of column (5), is 1.77). This may suggest that during
remarkably the same as that in Table 5.
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the crisis years, government-owned banks were considered to be sounder in comparison to
privately-owned institutions, leading to higher margins for the former. Second, the coeffi-
cient on the variable ‘Banking Reform’ turns out to be negative during the crisis years and
reaches statistical significance in two specifications (see columns (4) and (5) of Table 5). This
may imply that the positive impact of banking sector liberalization and the supervisory and
regulatory reforms on banks’ competitive conduct is particularly pronounced during financial
turmoils.
Are the impacts of inefficiency, diversification and customer deposits during the crisis years
conditional on the ownership status, as in the case of asset quality and capitalization? The
results in column (6) of Table 5 indicate that the answer is no. Specifically, the interaction
terms ‘Inefficiency ∗ Foreign’, ‘Diversification ∗ Foreign’ and ‘Customer Deposits ∗ Foreign’
enter the regression with small coefficient estimates and z-statistics (in absolute value) and
are jointly statistically insignificant, suggesting that the inclusion of these regressors adds
no explanatory power to the model. In addition, calculating the conditional effects of these
variables at the values one and zero of the foreign indicator reveals no statistically significant
differences between foreign- and domestically-owned banks16.
< Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here >
4.2.4 Robustness tests
To assess the robustness of the above findings we perform several tests. Table 6a and Ta-
ble 6b display the results of these tests17. First, we control for a number of additional variables
that have been used in previous studies to explain the competitiveness of the banking system
across countries. Specifically, we augment the model specifications with one of the following
variables: the EBRD index of reform of non-bank financial institutions (‘Non-bank Reform’)
as an indicator of interindustry competition; the EBRD index of competition policy (‘Com-
petition Policy’) as an additional proxy for banking market contestability; and the ratios
of money and quasi money to GDP (‘M2’) and private credit to GDP (‘Private Credit’) as
measures of the level of financial sector and banking sector development (relative to the econ-
omy), respectively18. These additional variables fail to reach statistical significance and the
key findings reported in the previous sections remain essentially intact (see Table 6a). Fur-
thermore, we experiment by replacing the variable ‘HHI’ with the three-bank concentration
16It must be stressed that the inclusion of too many interaction terms generates a great many instruments in
the GMM estimation and weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. In addition, it may lead
to collinearity and identification problems, and thus affect the interpretability of the estimated coefficients. To
minimize the risk of interaction terms spuriously capturing other features of the data, we perform a number of t-
tests and F -tests and select the most parsimonious specification to interpret our findings and draw conclusions.
According to these tests, only the interaction terms with ‘NPL’ and ‘Capitalization’ are both individually and
jointly statistically significant when added to the model.
17For brevity and comparability, Table 6a and Table 6b show the results of robustness tests implemented on
the model specification of column (5) in Table 2, Table 4 and Table 5. However, running the same tests using
the model specifications of columns (1) through (4) in these tables does not change the findings reported and
discussed in this section.
18We have also considered additional variables that may affect the dynamics of market power across countries,
namely the stock market capitalization to GDP as a proxy for the competition banks face from capital markets,
and indices of capital requirements, supervisory power and activity restrictions as measures of different com-
ponents of regulatory policies (Barth et al., 2008; Agoraki et al., 2011). Data on stock market capitalization
to GDP were collected from the World Bank’s WDI, whereas data on the regulatory policy indicators were
collected from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (2003 and 2007 versions). However,
due to a large number of missing observations for the sampled countries, we were unable to utilize these mea-
sures in our analysis. Notice, however, that the regulatory policy indicators exhibit little time-series variation
over the sampled period and that any time-invariant, country-specific effects are already captured in our model
by the country dummies.
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ratio (‘C3’) as a measure of the banking system concentration19, and by adding, among the
regressors, the foreign-owned banks’ market share in banking sector total assets (‘Foreign
Bank Share’) to capture the spillover effects of foreign penetration on competitive conduct.
Estimates based on these alternative specifications are very similar to the estimates reported
in the baseline regressions and do not change the inferences drawn (see columns (1)-(2), (5)-
(6) and (9)-(10) of Table 6b). The lack of explanatory power for the added measures can
partly be attributed to the short time series dimension of our sample and the existence of
high correlations with other country-level variables included in our model, such as ‘Growth’
and ‘Banking Reform’ (see Table A.3). Moreover, since the start of the transition process, the
sampled countries have achieved high levels of convergence with each other (and to a large
extent with the advanced European economies) in terms of financial regulatory frameworks
and market structures. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find weaker response to these
indicators compared to previous studies covering a wider, more heterogeneous cross-section of
countries and/or earlier time periods.
As already mentioned, the system-GMM estimator corrects for potential endogeneity prob-
lems stemming from the presence of simultaneous relationships between the Lerner index and
the bank-level variables included in vector X. However, another endogeneity concern that
arises here is that the foreign ownership indicator may not be exogenous relative to the de-
pendent variable. For instance, foreign investors may target banks with higher profitability
or bigger market share, known as “cherry picking” (see, for example, Berger et al., 2005;
Lanine & Vander Vennet, 2007). In addition, foreign bank penetration may get more exten-
sive in periods of financial turmoil when the barriers to entry are lower, and/or the takeover
of domestic banks with financial difficulties is encouraged by the authorities (Havrylchyk &
Jurzyk, 2011a). To control for the possibility of selection bias in our results, we re-estimate
all regression specifications using the pre-crisis values of foreign ownership; that is, assuming
that there is no change in ownership status during the crisis years. Despite the fact that this
approach eliminates the short-run effects of foreign acquisition on market power, the estimates
obtained provide evidence that validates the findings of the previous sections (see columns
(3), (7) and (11) of Table 6b). Notice that, even though the coefficient on the interaction
term ‘Capitalization ∗ Foreign’ appears now marginally statistically insignificant, the condi-
tional effects of capitalization on margins and the associated t-statistics are in line with those
reported in Table 3.
We also check whether our results hold when we take into account the severity of the crisis
for each country. All the CEE countries were undoubtedly hit hard by the recent episode of
financial distress, as a result of heightened risk aversion on the part of international investors
towards the region, general deleveraging by financial institutions and a marked contraction
in foreign demand (ECB, 2010). However, following Laeven & Valencia (2012), the recent
crisis had a systemic nature20 only for four of the sampled countries, namely Hungary, Latvia,
Slovenia and Ukraine - three out of which also had to request EU and IMF-led international
financial assistance. Therefore, one can argue that the reported results are mainly driven by
these four countries. To test for this, we estimate the same specifications as in the previous
sections using weighted regressions, where double weight is assigned to the aforementioned
countries. As shown in columns (4), (8) and (12) of Table 6b, the results are not much
influenced by this exercise, suggesting that assigning the same weight to all countries does
19The HHI is preferable to a k-bank concentration ratio because it takes into account the entire size distri-
bution and is sensitive to both the total number of firms and the relative distribution of size among firms. See
Bikker & Haaf (2002) for a thorough discussion of various measures of concentration.
20Laeven & Valencia (2012) define a banking crisis as systemic if the following two conditions are met: (i)
significant signs of financial distress in the banking system as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the
banking system and/or bank liquidations; (ii) significant banking policy intervention measures in response to
significant losses in the banking system.
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not bias our estimates nor lead to misleading inferences.
Finally, we conduct further tests of robustness, such as using the alternative Lerner in-
dex described in Section 3.1 as the dependent variable (obtained from country-by-country
regressions), adding to the model specifications the difference in M2 between the home and
host countries, and employing different instrument structures. Once again, estimates based
on these tests are very similar to our baseline estimates (results available upon request).
< Insert Table 6a and Table 6b here >
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an up-to-date assessment of market power in CEE banking markets and
some new insights into the mechanisms that determine its level and variation over time.
In particular, it contributes to the relevant literature in two main aspects. First, building
upon contributions by Angelini & Cetorelli (2003), Claessens & Laeven (2004), Ferna´ndez de
Guevara et al. (2005), Bikker et al. (2007) and Anzoategui et al. (2012), it models market power
by including controls for different ownership types and home country conditions. Second, it
analyzes the factors affecting market power by distinguishing between pre-crisis and crisis
times. Finally, to the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first study to comprehensively
examine the recent evolution of market power in the CEE banking markets which have been
highly vulnerable to the deepening European debt and banking crisis.
The overall picture that emerges from the evolution of the average Lerner indices suggests
that competitive conditions in banking sectors vary significantly across countries and over
time, despite some convergence in the pre-crisis period, and have changed with the onset of
the financial crisis. Concerning the analysis of the factors that affect market power, three
key results emerge. First, market power differs across banks with different ownership charac-
teristics. Specifically, foreign-owned banks originating from the EU and the US have higher
margins compared to privately-owned domestic banks. Second, the effects of asset quality and
capitalization on margins are different in the pre-crisis and crisis years. While in the pre-crisis
period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, during the crisis
period foreign ownership is found to eliminate the negative impact of non-performing loans
on margins possibly through signaling lower risk level or higher asset quality. Capitalization
level, on the other hand, becomes critically important only for domestically-owned banks,
suggesting that higher risk perceptions in financial markets disproportionately affect domes-
tic banks with lower capital levels. Third, the market power of foreign banks during the crisis
years responds positively to increases (decreases) in the home country growth rates (inflation
rates) relative to the corresponding rates in the host country, implying that banks originating
from countries with relatively better macroeconomic conditions managed to maintain higher
margins.
Despite the complexity of the relationship between market power and risk-taking in bank-
ing, there seems to be a trade-off between the two, and hence, the optimal regulation should
take into account the intensity of competition in the banking sector (Vives, 2011). Differ-
ent sources of competitive power between banks with different ownership and home country
characteristics, as well as varying competitive conditions over time (for example, during times
of financial turmoil), as documented here, point to the necessity of adjustments in the way
regulatory and competition policies should be combined in these countries.
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Table A.1: Description of variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Total Cost (TC) total expenses (at constant 2005 prices) BankScope
Quantity of Output (Q) total assets (at constant 2005 prices) BankScope
Price of Funds (W1) ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and short-term
funding
BankScope
Price of Capital (W2) ratio of total depreciation and other capital expenses to
total fixed assets
BankScope
Price of Labor (W3) ratio of personnel expenses to total assets BankScope
Price of Output (P ) ratio of total revenue to total assets BankScope
Lerner Index (L) ratio of the difference between price and marginal cost
to price (×100), where the marginal cost is estimated on
the basis of a translog cost function
BankScope & OC
Inefficiency ratio of non-interest expenses to total revenue (×100) BankScope
Diversification ratio of non-interest operating income to total revenue
(×100)
BankScope
Customer Deposits ratio of total customer deposits to total assets (×100) BankScope
NPL ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (×100) BankScope
Capitalization ratio of total equity to total assets (×100) BankScope
Market Share market share in banking sector total assets (×100) BankScope & OC
Growth annual growth rate of real GDP in the host country
(×100)
WDI
Inflation annual difference of log GDP deflator in the host country
(×100)
WDI
HHI normalised Herfindahl index for host country; calculated
as (H−1)/N
1−(1/N)
× 100, where H is the sum of squared shares
of total assets and N is the number of banks
BankScope & OC
C3 percentage of market share in banking sector total assets
held by the three largest banks (×100)
BankScope & OC
Foreign Bank Share foreign-owned banks’ market share in banking sector to-
tal assets (×100)
EBRD
M2 ratio of money and quasi money to GDP in the host
country (×100)
WDI
Private Credit ratio of private credit to GDP in the host country (×100) WDI
Banking Reform EBRD index of banking sector reform; ranges from 1.0
to 4.0+, with a higher number indicating a better score
EBRD
Non-Bank Reform EBRD index of reform of non-bank financial institutions;
ranges from 1.0 to 4.0+, with a higher number indicating
a better score
EBRD
Competition Policy EBRD index of competition policy; ranges from 1.0 to
4.0+, with a higher number indicating more effective en-
forcement of competition policy
EBRD
Foreign 0-1 dummy variable; takes value 1 if the bank is foreign-
owned (foreign-owned banks are defined as those with
foreign ownership exceeding 50% in year t)
BankScope & OC
State 0-1 dummy variable; takes value 1 if the bank is state-
owned (state-owned banks are defined as those with state
ownership exceeding 50% in year t)
BankScope & OC
Growth Gap difference between the growth rate in the home country of
the parent bank and the growth rate in the host country
BankScope & WDI
Inflation Gap difference between the inflation rate in the home coun-
try of the parent bank and the inflation rate in the host
country
BankScope & WDI
M2 Gap difference between the M2 to GDP ratio in the home
country of the parent bank and the M2 to GDP ratio in
the host country
BankScope & WDI
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
OC: Own Calculations
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Full sample period (2002-2010) Pre-crisis period (2002-2006) Crisis period (2007-2010)
Variable Obs Mean StDv Min Max Obs Mean StDv Min Max Obs Mean StDv Min Max
Total Cost a 1671 41.03 54.55 0.71 345.74 836 30.25 38.36 0.77 289.98 835 51.84 65.21 0.71 345.74
Quantity of Output a 1671 666.81 1000.22 12.86 5093.91 836 497.47 729.03 12.86 5093.91 835 836.35 1188.96 12.86 5093.91
Price of Funds 1671 0.045 0.031 0.001 0.266 836 0.040 0.027 0.002 0.232 835 0.050 0.034 0.001 0.266
Price of Capital 1671 2.73 6.18 0.06 101.47 836 2.54 5.72 0.06 101.47 835 2.93 6.61 0.06 85.47
Price of Labor 1671 0.020 0.015 0.001 0.128 836 0.021 0.015 0.002 0.128 835 0.020 0.015 0.001 0.116
Price of Output 1671 0.102 0.057 0.007 0.725 836 0.103 0.060 0.007 0.725 835 0.100 0.053 0.011 0.625
Lerner Index 1671 12.25 37.21 -560.44 85.84 836 15.29 30.17 -361.39 85.84 835 9.20 42.92 -560.44 73.86
Inefficiency 1668 47.97 29.28 7.99 368.22 835 48.58 27.33 8.98 368.22 833 47.36 31.11 7.99 299.55
Diversification 1669 24.38 16.62 -77.09 88.88 836 27.11 16.79 -48.05 88.88 833 21.63 16.00 -77.09 86.06
Customer Deposits 1646 55.70 23.80 0.04 96.23 827 57.17 23.81 0.07 96.23 819 54.21 23.71 0.04 95.25
NPL 1383 5.93 8.71 0.04 135.76 664 7.10 10.65 0.04 135.76 719 4.85 6.22 0.06 82.53
Capitalization 1671 17.03 12.70 0.33 88.26 836 17.43 13.18 0.33 88.26 835 16.63 12.20 0.35 82.34
Market Share 1671 8.22 10.36 0.10 77.74 836 8.73 10.85 0.16 77.74 835 7.71 9.83 0.10 64.90
Growth 1671 3.69 4.67 -17.95 12.23 836 5.53 2.27 0.85 12.23 835 1.85 5.64 -17.95 10.70
Inflation 1671 7.19 5.96 -2.34 37.08 836 7.23 5.77 -0.29 37.08 835 7.15 6.14 -2.34 25.14
HHI 1671 9.10 5.72 1.91 31.50 836 9.27 5.87 1.91 30.79 835 8.94 5.56 2.30 31.50
C3 1671 56.87 18.36 27.28 100.00 836 57.87 18.72 27.28 100.00 835 55.87 17.95 29.62 100.00
Foreign Bank Share 1616 66.61 25.39 8.10 99.20 836 61.55 27.64 8.10 97.30 780 72.02 21.46 19.70 99.20
M2 1660 46.29 13.75 11.10 79.67 834 41.08 13.02 11.10 69.25 826 51.55 12.40 21.37 79.67
Private Credit 1671 44.44 18.85 6.40 104.56 836 32.97 13.65 6.40 87.52 835 55.92 16.16 24.80 104.56
Banking Reform 1622 3.18 0.55 1.70 4.00 825 3.11 0.62 1.70 4.00 797 3.25 0.47 2.00 4.00
Non-Bank Reform 1622 2.57 0.67 1.70 4.00 825 2.52 0.66 1.70 4.00 797 2.63 0.67 1.70 4.00
Competition Policy 1578 2.41 0.58 1.00 3.33 781 2.28 0.64 1.00 3.33 797 2.54 0.48 1.67 3.33
Foreign 1671 0.57 0.50 0 1 836 0.60 0.49 0 1 835 0.54 0.50 0 1
State 1671 0.03 0.16 0 1 836 0.03 0.16 0 1 835 0.03 0.17 0 1
Growth Gap 1671 -1.28 2.86 -10.94 16.41 836 -1.65 2.42 -10.94 4.90 835 -0.90 3.19 -10.59 16.41
Inflation Gap 1671 -2.12 4.94 -24.37 28.55 836 -2.18 5.17 -22.68 28.55 835 -2.07 4.69 -24.37 13.11
M2 Gap 1671 41.63 58.19 -30.15 581.37 836 41.38 52.52 -30.15 581.37 835 41.87 63.39 -27.47 580.44
a Values are in million US dollars at constant 2005 prices.
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Table A.3: Cross correlation matrix for independent variables
Inefficiency Diversification Customer NPL Capitalization Market Growth Inflation HHI Banking Foreign State
Deposits Share Reform
Inefficiency 1.00
Diversification 0.14 1.00
Customer Deposits 0.02 0.14 1.00
NPL 0.11 0.27 -0.03 1.00
Capitalization 0.21 0.19 -0.36 0.32 1.00
Market Share -0.20 -0.10 0.07 -0.10 -0.30 1.00
Growth 0.01 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.05 1.00
Inflation -0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.11 -0.09 0.19 1.00
HHI 0.09 -0.05 0.21 0.04 -0.04 0.22 -0.08 -0.42 1.00
Banking Reform -0.08 -0.36 0.09 -0.20 -0.32 -0.04 0.34 -0.21 -0.40 1.00
Foreign 0.03 -0.06 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 0.22 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.03 1.00
State 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.17 1.00
Market Growth Inflation HHI Banking Non-Bank Competition M2 Private C3 Foreign
Share Reform Reform Policy Credit Bank Share
Non-bank Reform -0.06 -0.18 -0.26 -0.05 0.77 1.00
Competition Policy 0.02 -0.17 -0.25 -0.02 0.75 0.85 1.00
M2 -0.01 -0.35 -0.44 0.21 0.66 0.37 0.48 1.00
Private Credit -0.03 -0.43 -0.11 0.09 0.55 0.37 0.37 0.67 1.00
C3 0.42 0.02 -0.31 0.80 0.10 -0.12 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 1.00
Foreign Bank Share -0.05 -0.18 -0.52 0.45 0.55 0.23 0.18 0.48 0.30 0.26 1.00
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(a) Price (P ) (b) Marginal Cost (MC)
(c) Price minus Marginal Cost (P −MC) (d) Lerner Index (L)
Figure 1: Price, marginal cost and Lerner index: cross-country means and standard deviations
over the period 2002-2010 (calculated using the corresponding country-level values)
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Table 1: Evolution of market power in CEE banking sectors
Year(s) Albania Bosnia and Bulgaria Belarus Czech Croatia Hungary Latvia Moldova
Herzegovina Republic
2002 13.91 29.06 35.24 11.33 23.40 9.12 22.21 34.80
2003 3.88 24.19 29.85 7.86 25.38 4.49 21.13 38.16
2004 12.30 15.93 28.81 20.60 8.10 21.99 6.55 29.64 30.22
2005 24.58 20.38 29.04 19.77 11.56 20.23 9.69 34.42 22.22
2006 20.16 21.01 27.36 26.86 13.37 13.28 3.40 43.81 28.27
2007 20.11 22.99 31.32 31.13 17.49 16.31 -4.60 30.65 29.42
2008 19.90 14.59 24.71 30.29 22.42 12.86 -15.66 33.54 20.28
2009 16.71 19.50 23.83 27.20 26.97 16.62 -0.85 24.95 12.21
2010 19.96 22.32 25.67 26.99 24.13 15.51 -19.97 21.05 17.68
2002-2010 16.83 19.53 27.11 27.55 15.91 18.40 -0.87 29.04 25.92
Sign. testa 4.20 0.74 -1.31 2.44 12.31*** -5.53** -16.92 -2.70 -10.84***
(0.60) (0.24) (0.39) (0.69) (5.53) (2.33) (1.60) (0.48) (2.70)
Year(s) Montenegro FYR of Poland Romania Serbia Slovenia Slovakia Ukraine CEE17
Macedonia
2002 12.42 21.77 10.31 25.48 39.61 36.85 15.58 14.37 22.22
2003 25.06 28.36 -2.62 17.57 47.81 30.61 13.65 18.54 20.87
2004 21.68 28.38 11.35 24.87 30.93 34.37 8.62 20.38 20.87
2005 12.86 33.42 7.14 18.18 30.40 27.01 10.72 19.57 20.66
2006 13.17 33.84 20.89 10.33 15.20 21.86 18.24 18.31 20.55
2007 19.94 33.42 18.65 15.19 20.80 24.49 19.39 16.28 21.35
2008 13.42 27.75 14.63 22.05 10.10 16.18 29.88 21.91 18.76
2009 10.42 22.39 6.57 23.06 13.32 25.88 11.50 3.55 16.69
2010 16.69 19.73 19.49 23.12 5.03 30.58 16.41 6.82 17.13
2002-2010 16.18 27.67 11.82 19.98 23.69 27.54 16.00 15.53 19.90
Sign. testa -1.92 -3.33 5.42 1.57 -20.48*** -5.86 5.93** -6.09* -2.55
(0.48) (1.32) (1.22) (0.52) (4.54) (1.14) (2.11) (1.66) (1.34)
Columns report the yearly weighted average of the bank-level Lerner indices (the weight being the market share in banking sector total
customer deposits) for 17 CEE countries over the period 2002-2010. Higher values indicate increased market power; lower values indicate
increased competition. a Reports the results of a test (|t|-statistics in parenthesis), where H0: the difference in the weighted average of the
Lerner index between the pre-crisis years (2002-2006) and the crisis years (2007-2010) is equal to zero. ***,**,* Statistically significant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis 25
Table 2: Market power in CEE banking sectors: full sample period (2002-2010)
Dependent variable: Lerner Index (×100). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Lerner Index 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(4.35) (4.35) (4.32) (4.28) (4.21) (4.31)
Inefficiency -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.74*** -0.75*** -0.84***
(10.58) (11.31) (11.09) (11.68) (11.93) (10.87)
Diversification 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.61***
(7.30) (7.84) (7.82) (7.38) (7.91) (4.94)
Customer Deposits 0.10 0.12* 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.26*
(1.32) (1.68) (1.50) (1.58) (1.42) (1.81)
NPL -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.27 -0.28 -0.21
(0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.62) (0.66) (0.65)
NPL ∗ Foreign 0.25 0.24 0.26
(0.62) (0.62) (0.72)
Capitalization 0.48*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.88** 0.90** 0.86**
(3.52) (4.53) (4.74) (2.19) (2.33) (2.25)
Capitalization ∗ Foreign -0.56 -0.54 -0.50
(1.18) (1.15) (1.12)
Market Share 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.12
(1.36) (1.27) (1.29) (0.56) (0.70) (1.05)
Growth 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(2.82) (2.80) (2.73) (3.58) (3.71) (3.25)
Inflation 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.01
(0.85) (0.69) (0.65) (0.67) (0.16) (0.05)
HHI -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.22) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12) (0.11) (0.01)
Banking Reform -3.21 -3.04 -3.44 -4.91 -4.25 -3.14
(1.04) (1.00) (1.13) (1.60) (1.37) (1.40)
Foreign 3.64*** 12.25* 11.47 25.56
(2.59) (1.71) (1.58) (1.52)
Foreign ∗ EU 3.68** (1.52)
(2.27)
Foreign ∗ US 10.59***
(3.04)
Foreign ∗ Others 2.42
(1.15)
State 1.59 1.37 1.71 1.94 0.72
(0.84) (0.69) (0.74) (0.76) (0.36)
Growth Gap 0.24* 0.20
(1.65) (1.43)
Inflation Gap -0.19 -0.15
(1.44) (1.12)
Inefficiency ∗ Foreign 0.06
(0.90)
Diversification ∗ Foreign -0.15
(1.02)
Customer Deposits ∗ Foreign -0.23
(1.37)
Number of observations 1103 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
Number of banks 250 245 245 245 245 245
Number of instruments 161 163 165 191 193 235
AR(2) p-valuea 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.74 0.63 0.39
Hansen p-valueb 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.63
Columns report estimated coefficients (|z|-statistics). All specifications include size and country dummy
variables. Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors. a Reports the Arellano-Bond
test p-value for serial correlation of order two in the first-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
b Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are
valid. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 3: Conditional effects of NPL and Capitalization at one and zero value of the foreign variable
NPL Capitalization
Sample Period Foreign-owned Domestic-owned Foreign-owned Domestic-owned
(Foreign=1) (Foreign=0) (Foreign=1) (Foreign=0)
Full (2002-2010) -0.05 -0.28 0.36* 0.90**
(0.35) (0.66) (1.70) (2.33)
Pre-crisis (2002-2006) -0.08 0.21 0.94*** 0.66*
(0.44) (1.24) (4.91) (1.85)
Crisis (2007-2010) -0.25 -2.29** 0.12 0.80***
(1.01) (2.07) (0.42) (3.56)
Columns report estimated conditional coefficients (conditional |t|-statistics). The methods of calculating the
conditional coefficients and the conditional |t|-statistics are outlined by Friedrich (1982). ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 4: Market power in CEE banking sectors: pre-crisis period (2002-2006)
Dependent variable: Lerner Index (×100). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Lerner Index 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.20***
(3.66) (3.84) (3.72) (3.53) (3.09) (3.64)
Inefficiency -0.71*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.71*** -0.72*** -0.76***
(4.45) (4.57) (4.64) (4.98) (4.74) (5.23)
Diversification 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.46***
(3.83) (4.13) (3.94) (3.90) (3.97) (3.54)
Customer Deposits 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.26
(1.42) (1.27) (1.42) (1.08) (1.30) (1.28)
NPL 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.29
(1.19) (1.55) (1.58) (1.39) (1.24) (1.25)
NPL ∗ Foreign -0.28 -0.28 -0.38
(1.09) (1.11) (1.30)
Capitalization 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.56 0.66* 0.55
(3.69) (3.76) (3.96) (1.61) (1.85) (1.45)
Capitalization ∗ Foreign 0.33 0.28 0.30
(1.14) (0.98) (0.84)
Market Share 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.34** 0.38** 0.41**
(0.84) (1.07) (1.11) (2.13) (2.20) (2.12)
Growth -0.25 -0.21 -0.22 -0.07 -0.35 -0.01
(0.82) (0.70) (0.77) (0.22) (1.12) (0.01)
Inflation -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.01
(0.72) (0.68) (0.72) (0.30) (0.03) (0.01)
HHI -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.28 -0.27 -0.28
(0.95) (1.06) (1.10) (1.27) (1.33) (1.12)
Banking Reform 2.99 3.36 2.91 4.07 4.16 4.96
(0.92) (1.04) (0.89) (1.17) (1.26) (1.51)
Foreign 4.42** 0.79 -0.07 6.80
(2.34) (0.16) (0.01) (0.44)
Foreign ∗ EU 4.55**
(2.27)
Foreign ∗ US 9.27
(1.36)
Foreign ∗ Others 3.48
(1.40)
State 1.14 1.03 0.48 0.64 1.18
(0.46) (0.42) (0.15) (0.20) (0.27)
Growth Gap -0.71** -0.43
(2.17) (1.59)
Inflation Gap 0.07 0.07
(0.44) (0.44)
Inefficiency ∗ Foreign -0.02
(0.13)
Diversification ∗ Foreign 0.17
(1.03)
Customer Deposits ∗ Foreign -0.18
(0.83)
Number of observations 451 451 451 451 451 451
Number of banks 177 177 177 177 177 177
Number of instruments 100 102 104 118 120 144
AR(2) p-valuea 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.29 0.30
Hansen p-valueb 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.41 0.25
See notes for Table 2.
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Table 5: Market power in CEE banking sectors: crisis period (2007-2010)
Dependent variable: Lerner Index (×100). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Lerner Index 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(4.14) (4.16) (4.34) (3.53) (3.70) (3.17)
Inefficiency -0.81*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.88*** -0.95***
(15.01) (16.92) (16.38) (18.01) (19.12) (10.12)
Diversification 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.67***
(7.39) (7.76) (7.43) (10.07) (9.94) (5.20)
Customer Deposits 0.10 0.15* 0.14* 0.09 0.07 0.22
(1.17) (1.88) (1.72) (1.13) (0.87) (1.09)
NPL -1.18* -1.22* -1.21* -2.37** -2.29** -2.16*
(1.92) (1.90) (1.75) (2.09) (2.07) (1.84)
NPL ∗ Foreign 2.09** 2.04** 2.10*
(1.99) (2.01) (1.77)
Capitalization 0.36** 0.42** 0.39* 0.74*** 0.80*** 0.92***
(2.02) (2.06) (1.98) (3.32) (3.56) (3.93)
Capitalization ∗ Foreign -0.70* -0.68* -0.75**
(1.90) (1.75) (2.15)
Market Share 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.05 0.04
(1.57) (1.10) (1.20) (0.39) (0.25) (0.17)
Growth 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.24
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.66) (1.62) (1.48)
Inflation -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.18 -0.16
(0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.17) (0.97) (0.94)
HHI -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.10
(0.01) (0.13) (0.07) (0.36) (0.13) (0.50)
Banking Reform -6.71 -5.55 -5.88 -9.98** -8.38* -5.74
(1.24) (1.07) (1.12) (2.19) (1.78) (1.28)
Foreign 4.44** 5.94 4.73 16.42
(2.45) (0.81) (0.69) (0.79)
Foreign ∗ EU 4.50**
(2.13)
Foreign ∗ US 9.57**
(2.23)
Foreign ∗ Others 3.14
(1.23)
State 3.27 3.23 5.79 6.17* 3.18
(1.46) (1.45) (1.50) (1.77) (0.98)
Growth Gap 0.42*** 0.34
(2.93) (1.47)
Inflation Gap -0.36** -0.39*
(2.06) (1.87)
Inefficiency ∗ Foreign 0.10
(1.04)
Diversification ∗ Foreign -0.26*
(1.75)
Customer Deposits ∗ Foreign -0.16
(0.72)
Number of observations 617 617 617 617 617 617
Number of banks 205 205 205 205 205 205
Number of instruments 140 142 144 166 168 204
AR(2) p-valuea 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.24
Hansen p-valueb 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.21 0.38 0.58
Joint significance testc 0.05 0.08 0.08
Joint significance testd 0.12
See notes for Table 2. c Reports the χ2-test p-value, where H0: the coefficients on the interaction terms
between the foreign-ownership indicator and the variables ‘NPL’, and ‘Capitalization’ are jointly equal to
zero. d Reports the χ2-test p-value, where H0: the coefficients on the interaction terms between the foreign-
ownership indicator and the variables ‘Inefficiency’, ‘Diversification’ and ‘Customer Deposits’ are jointly equal
to zero.
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Table 6a: Market power in CEE banking sectors: robustness tests
Dependent variable: Lerner Index (×100). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Full sample period Pre-crisis period Crisis period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Lerner Index 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(4.28) (3.96) (4.14) (4.23) (3.07) (2.82) (3.20) (3.22) (3.77) (3.71) (3.47) (3.81)
Inefficiency -0.75*** -0.78*** -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.71*** -0.93*** -0.73*** -0.70*** -0.88*** -0.88*** -0.89*** -0.87***
(12.05) (13.42) (11.89) (11.92) (4.68) (10.29) (5.40) (4.80) (18.77) (19.01) (17.24) (19.51)
Diversification 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
(7.91) (8.45) (8.24) (8.13) (3.80) (3.90) (3.62) (3.81) (10.04) (10.39) (10.88) (9.71)
NPL -0.30 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.19 -2.28** -2.26* -2.21** -2.30**
(0.71) (0.76) (0.75) (0.73) (1.15) (1.03) (1.00) (1.13) (2.14) (1.99) (2.19) (1.98)
NPL ∗ Foreign 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.30 -0.26 -0.20 -0.24 -0.24 2.05** 1.99* 1.92** 2.05*
(0.74) (0.77) (0.67) (0.74) (1.02) (0.64) (0.98) (0.94) (2.09) (1.88) (2.01) (1.92)
Capitalization 0.92** 0.86** 0.89** 0.88** 0.65* 0.53** 0.64* 0.63* 0.78*** 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.79***
(2.44) (2.26) (2.39) (2.31) (1.83) (2.14) (1.91) (1.79) (3.56) (3.55) (3.59) (3.34)
Capitalization ∗ Foreign -0.56 -0.62 -0.55 -0.50 0.29 0.20 0.27 0.27 -0.68* -0.67* -0.78* -0.66*
(1.21) (1.37) (1.11) (1.12) (1.03) (0.86) (0.94) (0.93) (1.77) (1.82) (1.87) (1.69)
Growth 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** -0.36 -0.37 -0.39 -0.33 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.17
(3.41) (3.02) (2.94) (2.96) (1.23) (1.47) (1.29) (1.02) (1.27) (1.30) (1.39) (1.27)
Inflation 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15
(0.07) (0.25) (0.10) (0.26) (0.05) (0.72) (0.01) (0.03) (0.90) (0.89) (0.91) (0.73)
Banking Reform -2.7 -3.86 -3.84 -1.42 3.89 2.99 3.86 3.87 -7.00 -5.94 -7.98 -6.67
(1.09) (1.37) (1.25) (0.51) (1.16) (1.11) (1.15) (0.94) (1.59) (1.37) (1.60) (1.37)
Growth Gap 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 -0.72** -0.68** -0.73** -0.69** 0.37** 0.39*** 0.38** 0.41***
(1.53) (1.44) (1.48) (1.45) (2.25) (2.29) (2.29) (2.17) (2.29) (2.59) (2.37) (2.83)
Inflation Gap -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.33* -0.36** -0.32* -0.36**
(1.22) (1.35) (1.51) (1.32) (0.32) (0.14) (0.40) (0.39) (1.87) (2.09) (1.95) (1.97)
Non-Bank Reform -3.35 2.10 -5.61
(1.24) (0.73) (1.43)
Competition Policy -3.53 -0.05 -4.21
(1.61) (0.02) (1.55)
M2 -0.07 -0.06 0.03
(0.73) (0.26) (0.22)
Private Credit -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
(1.40) (0.06) (1.25)
Number of observations 1068 1042 1059 1068 451 425 451 451 617 617 608 617
Number of banks 245 236 245 245 177 168 177 177 205 205 205 205
Number of instruments 194 192 194 195 121 119 121 122 169 169 169 170
AR(2) p-valuea 0.69 0.56 0.36 0.68 0.25 0.14 0.39 0.39 0.23 0.31 0.07 0.29
Hansen p-valueb 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.49 0.55 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.41
See notes for Table 2. For brevity, the estimated coefficients on ‘Customer Deposits’, ‘Market Share’, ‘HHI’, ‘Foreign’ and ‘State’ are not displayed.
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Table 6b: Market power in CEE banking sectors: robustness tests (continued)
Dependent variable: Lerner Index (×100). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Full sample period Pre-crisis period Crisis period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Lerner Index 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.19***
(4.17) (4.37) (4.23) (3.26) (3.46) (3.14) (3.09) (2.93) (3.86) (3.75) (3.03) (2.92)
Inefficiency -0.74*** -0.74*** -0.75*** -0.69*** -0.72*** -0.68*** -0.72*** -0.71*** -0.88*** -0.87*** -0.86*** -0.84***
(11.92) (11.10) (11.70) (8.67) (4.92) (4.94) (4.74) (4.68) (18.64) (16.65) (15.21) (10.51)
Diversification 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.50***
(7.93) (7.91) (9.00) (7.07) (3.58) (3.23) (3.97) (3.95) (9.73) (9.40) (8.05) (8.14)
NPL -0.31 -0.37 -0.19 -0.58 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.27 -2.26** -2.35* -2.51* -2.76**
(0.72) (0.88) (0.53) (0.81) (1.16) (1.23) (1.24) (1.07) (1.98) (1.87) (1.95) (2.17)
NPL ∗ Foreign 0.25 0.36 0.05 0.49 -0.28 -0.23 -0.28 -0.36 1.99* 2.10* 2.10* 2.50**
(0.61) (0.87) (0.17) (0.83) (1.19) (0.86) (1.11) (1.10) (1.85) (1.80) (1.75) (2.17)
Capitalization 0.89** 0.95** 0.71** 0.96** 0.64** 0.61* 0.66* 0.62* 0.81*** 0.87*** 0.67*** 0.75***
(2.25) (2.41) (1.96) (1.99) (2.07) (1.78) (1.85) (1.91) (3.68) (4.12) (3.13) (3.40)
Capitalization ∗ Foreign -0.54 -0.65 -0.31 -0.76 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.33 -0.69* -0.75** -0.53 -0.70*
(1.11) (1.20) (0.69) (1.09) (0.98) (1.03) (0.98) (1.21) (1.85) (2.31) (1.58) (1.77)
Growth 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.28*** -0.28 -0.31 -0.35 -0.24 0.22* 0.16 0.24* 0.21
(3.58) (2.84) (3.93) (2.93) (1.04) (1.07) (1.12) (0.79) (1.82) (0.95) (1.72) (1.44)
Inflation -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.21 -0.15 -0.18 -0.25
(0.15) (0.43) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (1.11) (0.75) (0.97) (1.36)
Banking Reform -5.04 -2.54 -2.09 -5.87 4.43 2.16 4.16 4.03 -8.00* -8.51* -5.24 -7.47
(1.56) (0.96) (0.85) (1.31) (1.24) (0.55) (1.26) (1.17) (1.72) (1.86) (1.16) (1.36)
Growth Gap 0.23 0.18 0.25* 0.30* -0.72** -0.73** -0.71** -0.62** 0.40*** 0.31 0.46*** 0.42**
(1.59) (1.21) (1.78) (1.70) (2.25) (2.46) (2.17) (1.96) (2.79) (1.58) (2.81) (2.28)
Inflation Gap -0.21 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.10 -0.40** -0.37** -0.37** -0.38**
(1.52) (1.11) (1.39) (1.36) (0.30) (0.24) (0.44) (0.55) (2.26) (2.25) (2.43) (2.14)
C3 0.13 -0.07 0.19
(1.37) (0.64) (1.21)
Foreign Bank Share -0.08 0.07 -0.10
(1.09) (1.24) (1.04)
Number of observations 1068 1040 1068 1068 451 451 451 451 617 589 617 617
Number of banks 245 243 245 245 177 177 177 177 205 203 205 205
Number of instruments 193 194 193 193 120 121 120 120 168 169 168 168
AR(2) p-valuea 0.56 0.89 0.64 0.95 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.24 0.54
Hansen p-valueb 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.48
See notes for Table 2. For brevity, the estimated coefficients on ‘Customer Deposits’, ‘Market Share’, ‘HHI’, ‘Foreign’ and ‘State’ are not displayed. Equations in columns (1), (5) and
(9) exclude the variable ‘HHI’. Equations in columns (3), (7) and (11) are estimated using the pre-crisis values of foreign ownership. Equations in columns (4), (8) and (12) are estimated
using weighted regressions, where double weight is assigned to the countries for which the crisis had a systemic nature.
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